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Abstract 
Constitutive panpsychism is the doctrine that macro-level consciousness—that is, consciousness 
of the sort possessed by certain composite things such as humans—is built out of irreducibly 
mental (or proto-mental) features had by some or all of the basic physical constituents of reality. 
On constitutive panpsychism, changes in macro-level consciousness amount to changes in either 
the way that micro-conscious entities ‘bond’ or the way that micro-conscious qualities ‘blend’ 
(or both). I pose the ‘Selection Problem’ for constitutive panpsychism: the problem of explaining 
how high-level functional states of the brain ‘select’ micro-conscious qualities for bonding or 
blending. I argue that there are no empirically plausible solutions to this problem.  
 
Keywords 
Panpsychism, Neuroscience, Consciousness 
 
1. Introduction 
Constitutive panpsychism is the doctrine that macro-level consciousness—that is, consciousness 
of the sort possessed by certain composite things such as humans—is built out of irreducibly 
mental (or proto-mental) features had by some or all of the basic physical constituents of reality. 
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Constitutive panpsychism is motivated by a pair of considerations.1 First, contrary to standard 
forms of physicalism, phenomenal properties are irreducible to the structural-dynamical 
properties that comprise the explanatory apparatus of the physical sciences. Second, contrary to 
standard forms of dualism, nature is unified and causally closed, amenable to transparent, 
bottom-up explanation at all ontological levels. Constitutive panpsychism presents an elegant 
alternative to both physicalism and dualism. Just as the structural-dynamical features of the basic 
physical constituents of reality explain the structural-dynamical nature of reality at every 
ontological level, so the intrinsic features of these entities—specifically, their phenomenal or 
proto-phenomenal features (henceforth, I’ll elide the second option)—explain the phenomenal 
nature of reality at every ontological level (that has a phenomenal nature).2 
 In this paper, I argue that constitutive panpsychism cannot explain the dynamics of 
consciousness. More precisely, it is unable to explain how distinct sets of micro-conscious 
qualities (that is, the phenomenal features of the ultimate physical constituents) are ‘selected’, 
moment-to-moment, to form an evolving stream of macro-consciousness. I call this ‘the 
Selection Problem’. 
 
2. Getting Constitutive Panpsychism Up and Running: Bonding and Blending 
Constitutive panpsychists notoriously face the ‘Combination Problem,’ the problem of 
explaining how micro-phenomenal ‘ingredients’ could combine to form consciousness as we 
																																																						
1 See, for example, the ‘nonreductionism’ and ‘nonemergence’ premises in Nagel [1979]; the ‘argument from 
intrinsic natures’ and the ‘genetic argument’ discussed by Bruntrup and Jaskolla [2017]; the ‘conceivability 
argument’ and the ‘causal argument’ in Chalmers [2017a]. 
2 The view I am calling ‘constitutive panpsychism’ could also be called ‘constitutive micropsychism’, since it 
includes an explicit commitment to ‘bottom up’ explanatory structure. It thus contrasts with constitutive 
cosmopsychism, a version of panpsychism committed instead to top-down explanatory structure. I return to the topic 
of constitutive cosmopsychism in the concluding section below. 
	 3	
know it. Chalmers [2017b] has anatomized the Combination Problem, revealing several sub-
problems, including: 
• The subject-summing problem: the problem of explaining how a unitary macro-subject 
(that is, a bearer of macro-conscious states) can arise from a plurality of micro-subjects 
(that is, the bearers of micro-conscious states); 
• The palette problem: the problem of explaining how the multiplicity of types of macro-
conscious qualities, and the multiplicity of determinates within those types, can arise 
from the qualities supposedly instantiated at the micro-level. 
I will now sketch the picture that emerges from the literature on the subject-summing and palette 
problems, since these details will be relevant later on.  
The subject-summing problem derives from the explanatory gap that holds between 
aggregates of micro-subjects, on the one hand, and the macro-subjects they are said to constitute, 
on the other. The simplest solution to the problem is to espouse a form of mereological 
universalism for micro-subjects. But this ‘solution’ to the problem is unattractive because it 
implies that the macro-subject I call ‘me’ is no less unified than a ‘subject’ consisting of seven 
quarks scattered throughout the universe; with the fusion of me and all the quarks making up the 
Orion Nebula; and so on. There must be something more to subject-summing than mere 
aggregation, in other words. 
 Goff [2017a] points out that our physical theories make mention not only of entities and 
their monadic properties, but also of relations that hold among the entities. But the physical 
theories themselves only inform us about the structural-dynamical side of reality, not its intrinsic 
nature, and this is no less true of relations than of entities and monadic properties. Goff proposes 
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that the intrinsic nature of one of the physical relations does the work of uniting micro-subjects. 
He calls this hidden relational property ‘phenomenal bonding’.  
 But which of the physical relations has this intrinsic nature? Goff tentatively proposes the 
spatial relation as the relation in question. Roelofs [2019] suggests that the imposition of one of 
the physical forces might play the bonding-role.3 A third alternative, discussed by both Chalmers 
[2017b] and Goff [2017b], is that the bonding-relation is a neurologically-specific causal 
relation, such as being-a-part-of-a-brain-like system, or being-neurally-informationally-related in 
certain ways. For convenience, I’ll extend Goff’s label ‘phenomenal bonding’ to cover all three 
of these options. 
 The palette problem derives from the observation that macro-conscious states contain 
myriad qualities native to multiple, discreet quality-spaces. For example, not only can conscious 
experiences include any number of determinate color-qualities, they can also include any number 
of determinate olfactory qualities, and qualities of the two types are apparently irreducible to one 
another. Whence this rich array of macro-conscious qualities? 
 There are two theoretical choice-points confronting any putative solution to the palette 
problem. The first is the choice between positing many or few basic micro-phenomenal qualities. 
Chalmers [2017b] calls the two theoretical options ‘small-palette’ and ‘large-palette’ solutions, 
respectively. Constitutive panpsychists are apt to prefer small over large palettes, for three 
reasons. The first is parsimony: all things considered it would be better to posit a few basic 
properties than a great many. The second is fungibility: if two structures are physically identical 
to each other, then they can be swapped out for one another in an organism without any shift in 
function, including mental function. (This principle rules out a view on which some up-quarks 
																																																						
3 Roelofs calls the relevant relation ‘phenomenal unity’, whose nature is introspectively manifest, he claims, rather 
than ‘hidden’, per Goff. 
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have a particular shade of red as their intrinsic nature whereas other up-quarks have the sound of 
pure middle-C as their intrinsic nature, and so on.) A third motivation is Russellianism, 
according to which each fundamental physical property (mass, charge, spin, and perhaps others) 
has a proprietary ‘quiddity’ as its categorical base. According to Russellian constitutive 
panpsychism, there are only as many micro-phenomenal qualities as there are fundamental 
physical properties. 
This is not to say that large-palette solutions are ruled out for the constitutive 
panpsychist. Lewtas [2017] offers two ways that a large-palette solution can respect fungibility 
(though not parsimony or Russellianism). On the first, all basic physical entities of a single type 
instantiate myriad phenomenal qualities; when these entities partly compose certain complex 
physical structures, one of these qualities gets ‘chosen’ as the property experienced by that 
structure as a whole. On the second, all basic physical entities of a single type instantiate a 
determinable property corresponding to one of the phenomenal quality-spaces (color, smell, 
sound, etc.); when these entities partly compose certain complex physical structures, this 
determinable property gets ‘collapsed’ into a determinate quality experienced by that structure. 
On both of these proposals, it is the structure of the composite entity of which a basic physical 
entity is a part that determines which micro-quality that entity contributes to the macro-palette.  
The second choice-point has to do with the nature of the relation that holds between 
micro- and macro-conscious qualities. Given the richness of the macro-palette, only proposals 
that posit exceedingly large micro-palettes will be able to think of this relation as identity. For all 
others, the relation in question will involve some form of ‘blending’. The best-developed account 
of blending comes from Roelofs [2014]. On Roelofs’ proposal, blending occurs when multiple 
micro-conscious qualities are experienced together. He illustrates the idea by appealing to cases 
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in which an aesthetic novice treats certain phenomenal qualities as simple that a connoisseur can 
recognize as complex—the sound of a musical triad or the taste of wine, for example. Roelofs 
calls this inability of ours to distinguish co-experienced micro-conscious qualities ‘confusion’.4 
Lewtas [2017] describes a related proposal, on which blending is akin to a pointillist illusion. 
There are thus three ways that a constitutive panpsychist can go about solving the palette 
problem: an extreme large-palette solution that posits one micro-quality for every determinate 
macro-quality; a moderate large-palette solution, where a composite entity determines which 
micro-quality each of its basic physical constituents contributes to the macro-palette, via Lewtas-
style ‘choosing’ or ‘collapse’; a small palette solution in tandem with Roelofs-style ‘confusion’. 
Because the first option violates fungibility, I’ll set it aside, and for convenience I’ll extend 
Roelofs’ label ‘phenomenal blending’ to cover choosing, collapse and confusion.  
 
3. The Selection Problem 
Solving the Combination Problem in its various forms, including the two just discussed, does not 
fully clear the way for constitutive panpsychism: it still faces the Selection Problem. The 
Selection Problem emerges from the fact that consciousness changes. This fact is among the 
most easily demonstrated of facts: simply blink, or move your head, and you have witnessed a 
change in your (visual) consciousness. Such changes in consciousness are a matter, for the 
constitutive panpsychist, of changes with respect to which qualities are ‘selected’ for inclusion in 
a bonded/blended macro-consciousness. The Selection Problem is the problem of explaining how 
																																																						
4 Note that Roelofs takes confusion to be the default result of bonding. Thus, blending is to be explained in terms of 
the absence of a differentiation-mechanism rather than the presence of blending-mechanism. More on this in section 
3 below. 
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such ‘selection’ occurs, consistent with what neuroscience teaches about the architecture and 
dynamics of the brain.5  
A brief review of the relevant empirical details is in order. Like everything else, brains 
are made of fundamental stuff. In particular, they are made of up-quarks, down-quarks, and 
electrons. Two up-quarks and a down-quark joined together via the strong force constitute a 
proton; two down-quarks and an up-quark joined together via the strong force constitute a 
neutron. Six protons plus between six and eight neutrons all joined together via the weak force 
constitute a carbon nucleus. 
Like everything else in the body, brains are made predominantly of carbon-based 
molecules—in which hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are carbon’s most common bonding-
partners—of four types: fatty acids, sugars, amino acids, and nucleotides. These molecules make 
up the vast majority of the chemical structures and mechanisms found in cells.  
The brain is a composite of cells of two types (plus blood vessels, fluid, and other types 
of packaging): neurons and glia, both of which admit of many sub-types. While glial cells 
perform many important functions in the brain—not all of which are well understood—most 
brain research continues to be focused on neurons and their functions, since glial activity 
facilitates neural activity rather than the other way around, and neural activity seems to be at the 
heart of what the brain does. (More on this below.) What makes neurons so special are the 
branches that project outward from their cell body, known as ‘dendrites’ and ‘axons’, which are 
generally thought of as signal-receiving and signal-sending branches, respectively. All cells are 
																																																						
5 Einar Duenger Bohn [2018] has recently proposed an alternative to constitutive panpsychism that he calls 
‘pluralized panpsychism’. On this view, macro-consciousness is a fundamental property exhibited by a plurality of 
basic physical entities. He contends that the Combination Problem does not come up for his view. It is worth noting 
that the Selection Problem does still come up: we are still owed an explanation of how the physical dynamics of the 
plurality bring about changes in that fundamental property.  
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enclosed by a ‘skin’ made predominantly of lipids (structures made of fatty acids) and proteins 
(structures made of amino acids). One function of these cell membranes is to keep negatively-
charged ions outside of cells and to keep positively-charged ions inside of cells. The membrane 
enclosing neuronal dendrites and axons has an added feature: it is punctuated by so-called 
‘voltage gated ion-channels’, that is, apertures that allow for the movement of molecules in and 
out of the cell. When these gates open, positively-charged sodium ions flow into the cell from 
outside. The resulting cascade of electrical de-polarization down the length of an axon is called 
an ‘action potential’. When such a cascade reaches the axon’s extremity, it occasions the 
transmission of ‘neurotransmitter’ compounds across a gap (‘synapse’) between the tip of the 
axon and the dendrite of another neuron.  
Via synaptic connections, the neurons in the brain form an immensely complicated, 
interconnected functional web. One neuron’s action potential can cue action potentials virtually 
anywhere else in the brain. Feedback loops make possible non-linear effects including, among 
other things, synchronous action-potentials within assemblies of many neurons acting as 
functional units. Coordinated activity within anatomically localizable assemblies correlates with 
(subjects’ reports of) specific types of changes in consciousness. For example, there are 
assemblies of neurons in visual cortex whose firing correlates with subjects’ conscious 
experience of certain colors, shapes, motions, and so forth. Activations of such assemblies (or 
sometimes the assemblies themselves) that seem to ‘code for’ particular conscious qualities are 
referred to as ‘neural correlates of consciousness’.6 	
In light of these details about the brain, we can frame the Selection Problem informally as 
follows. If constitutive panpsychism is correct, then there has to be some way for 
																																																						
6 For details and ongoing controversies related to the neural correlates of consciousness, see, e.g., Koch [2004], 
Tononi and Koch [2008], Hohwy and Bayne [2015]. 
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bonding/blending between and among the relevant micro-conscious physical structures to 
undergo changes that are explanatorily downstream from activity in specific neural assemblies. 
But there is no apparent way for this to occur. 
More formally: 
1. If constitutive panpsychism is true, changes in consciousness (in beings like us) are 
wholly grounded in changes with respect to phenomenal bonding among micro-subjects 
or phenomenal blending among the qualities had by micro-subjects (for short: changes 
with respect to bonding/blending). 
2. Changes in consciousness (in beings like us) are explanatorily dependent on changes with 
respect to high-level, global, dynamical properties of brains. 
3. For any distinct phenomena A and B, if phenomenon A is explanatorily dependent on 
phenomenon B, then whatever wholly grounds phenomenon A is explanatorily dependent 
on (or identical to) phenomenon B. 
4. So, if constitutive panpsychism is true, changes with respect to bonding/blending are 
explanatorily dependent on changes with respect to high-level, global, dynamical 
properties of brains. 
5. If changes with respect to bonding/blending are explanatorily dependent on changes with 
respect to high-level, global, dynamical properties of brains, there is a physical, causal 
mechanism in the brain that inputs changes with respect to high-level, global, dynamical 
properties and outputs changes with respect to bonding/blending.  
6. There is no purely physical, causal mechanism with this profile. 
7. So, constitutive panpsychism is false. 
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I take premise 3 as a fairly obvious principle about explanatory dependence. In case it 
does not strike the reader as obvious, I offer the following illustration as motivation. A choir 
sounds a unison note with a particular pitch, timbre, volume, and duration. The sounding of the 
note is wholly grounded in respiratory-acoustic events occurring within and around the bodies of 
the choristers. No viable explanation of the note’s character is explanatorily independent of these 
respiratory-acoustic events. And this is true whether the explanans is wholly metaphysically 
distinct from the grounds—for example, the shape of the hall, the motions of the conductor—or 
not wholly distinct—for example, the velocity of exhalation, the number of choristers. All viable 
explanations will be ‘routed through’ the relevant respiratory-acoustic events. Premise 3 
generalizes from this observation. It says that that nothing can explain a phenomenon A while 
bearing no explanatory relationship to A’s grounds. 
So much for Premise 3. Premise 4 is a sub-conclusion that rests on premises 1-3. So, the 
substantive premises are 1, 2, 5, and 6. I now discuss each of these premises in detail. 
Premise 1. If constitutive panpsychism is true, changes in consciousness (in beings like 
us) are wholly grounded in changes with respect to phenomenal bonding among micro-subjects 
or phenomenal blending among the qualities of micro-subjects (for short: changes with respect 
to bonding/blending). This premise assumes that constitutive panpsychists must appeal to 
theories of phenomenal bonding and phenomenal blending in order to solve the subject-summing 
and palette problems, respectively. Perhaps there are ways to solve, or dissolve, those two 
problems while rejecting this assumption. I grant that my argument has no force against these 
alternatives; but in light of the recent literature discussed in section 2 above, the assumption 
seems well founded. 
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There is more than one way for a constitutive panspsychist to understand the relationship 
between bonding and blending. On one view of the relationship, the architecture of the brain 
guarantees more-or-less stable bonding among some set of micro-subjects that make it up, but 
within this stable composite, changes occur regarding the way micro-qualities blend. Call this the 
‘bonding-first’ paradigm. We can contrast this with the ‘blending-first’ paradigm, on which the 
architecture of the brain guarantees more-or-less stable blending within certain chemical 
structures, but among these structures, changes occur regarding which structures bond with one 
another.  
There are more complicated options. Perhaps blending occurs at two levels: stably, as a 
prerequisite to bonding, and then differentially, within the bond. Perhaps neither bonding nor 
blending is stable, but both are independent ways that macro-consciousness can change. For 
simplicity, I will focus my discussion on the two simplest options. My criticisms will extend to 
more elaborate theories of the hierarchy of composite consciousness. 
Note that I am restricting my discussion to qualitative changes in consciousness. There 
may be changes that outstrip the qualitative: for example, changes pertaining to semantic 
structure (that is, which qualities are co-attributed); attentional shifts; changes in the ‘level’ of 
consciousness (that is, whether one is wide awake, sleepy, dreaming, etc.). Though interesting in 
their own right (and in need of explanation by constitutive panpsychists), such non-qualitative 
changes are only relevant to the Selection Problem if they entail qualitative changes (as, for 
example, Roelofs maintains—see the discussion of premise 5 below). 
Premise 2. Changes in consciousness (in beings like us) are explanatory dependent on 
changes with respect to high-level, global, dynamical properties of brains. When I say that 
certain changes in conscious states are ‘explanatorily dependent’ on changes in brains, I mean 
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something neutral among various dependence-relations, including identity (the limiting case of 
explanatory dependence), constitution, causation, nomic necessitation, or something even 
weaker,7 though I argue below that constitutive panpsychists will need to think of such 
dependence in causal terms.  
I emphasize that the dependence is on dynamical properties of brains. Perhaps brains also 
undergo changes with respect to intrinsic qualities that are not identical to dynamical properties, 
but I am interested in those properties that neuroscience treats as explanatorily relevant. 
 Why think that changes in conscious states are explanatorily dependent on changes with 
respect to high-level and global properties of the brain, rather than with respect to local and/or 
low-level (physical or chemical) properties of the brain? That the relevant properties are high-
level is evident in two ways. First, this is how neuroscientists talk. They talk of the ‘firing’ or 
‘spiking’ of individual neurons, or of ‘signaling’ among neural assemblies. None of these ways 
of talking mentions the physical and chemical mechanisms that make action potentials possible. 
Rather, neuroscientists understand that neurons have an essential function—that is, a critical role 
in the economy of an organism—just as hearts and other organs do. This function can be 
specified, and to a certain extent studied, while abstracting away from the details of the 
mechanisms that implement it. Second, and relatedly: the series of events that implements this 
function of sending electrical signals is strikingly heterogeneous: the opening of a series of gates 
in the membrane, the motion of ions, the release of neurotransmitters, and the chemical bonding 
of these proteins to neuroreceptors. These events are unified only in so far as they jointly realize 
a high-level functional property. 
																																																						
7 As an example of something weaker, in Woodward [2019] I suggest that the relationship is something like an 
interpretation-relation. 
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 Why think that neural correlates of changes in consciousness are global properties of the 
brain? Suppose Koch [2004] is right that activity in the section of visual cortex known as ‘V4’ 
correlates with visual phenomenology. While it is tempting to think of ‘activity in V4’ as a local 
(albeit high-level) property of the brain, we should resist this temptation, because what it is to be 
V4 is not a local matter. This is evident, first, from the fact that neurons in V4 have no intrinsic 
features that makes them especially suited to represent color-stimuli (say). What makes it the 
case that their activity represents color-stimuli is their particular place in the informational 
network of the brain. Second, the possibility of variation across brains, and in the same brain 
over time (so-called “neural plasticity”) means that gross anatomy is only a contingent guide to 
functional specification in cortex. An extreme example is a girl who was born with only one 
brain hemisphere, but who has developed more or less normally [Muckli, Naumer, and Singer 
2009]. 
 In short, the neural events that drive the dynamics of consciousness high-level functions 
in more or less the whole brain (or at least a major chunk of the cortex and thalamus). 
Premise 5. If changes with respect to bonding/blending are explanatorily dependent on 
changes with respect to high-level, global, dynamical properties of brains, there is a physical, 
causal mechanism in the brain that inputs changes with respect to high-level, global properties 
and outputs changes with respect to bonding/blending. Given the innocuous principle about 
explanatory dependence stated in premise 3, it follows that if constitutive panpsychism is true, 
changes with respect to bonding/blending are explanatorily dependent on changes with respect to 
high-level, global, dynamical properties of brains. Constitutive panpsychists need a story to tell 
about this explanatory relationship. Premise 5 specifies that the story needs to appeal to 
causation to account for this explanatory dependence, rather than to a tighter dependence-
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relation such as constitution, or a looser dependence-relation such as nomic necessitation. Why 
can’t constitutive panpsychists say that changes with respect to neural firing constitute changes 
with respect to bonding/blending? Consider, by way of analogy, a rotating bicycle wheel. The 
spokes of the wheel change their orientation vis-à-vis the surface of the road, from perpendicular 
to oblique to parallel and back again, and these changes are explanatorily dependent on the 
spinning of the wheel. There is nothing mysterious about such dependence, since changes in the 
orientation of the wheel constitute changes in the orientation of its parts. Constitutive 
panpsychists could say something similar, by identifying some part of the neural-firing process 
with changes in bonding/blending.  
Exactly how such a story could go depends on whether we’re working within a bonding-
first or a blending-first paradigm. Let’s start with a blending-first paradigm, on which changes in 
macro-consciousness amount to changes in phenomenal bonding. Extant theories identify 
phenomenal bonding with (A) spatial relations, (B) relations of physical force imposition, or (C) 
high-level causal relations such as being part of a brain or being neurally-informationally 
related. Are there entities in the brain such that neural firing makes a constitutive difference to 
which other entities they bear these relations to? 
The answer is yes. (A) Action-potentials involve changes with respect to the spatial 
relations that hold between, for example, sodium ions and the axon membrane they move across. 
(B) Synaptic transmission involves changes with respect to the chemical bonds between 
neurotransmitters and neuroreceptors. (C) There is no clear sense in which the firing of neural 
assemblies alters which entities are part of the brain, but such firings do alter the informational 
relationships among neural assemblies that code for different conscious qualities.  
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For any of the relational changes just mentioned to explain changes in phenomenal 
bonding, there would have to be a one-to-one matching between (a) the firing of a neural 
assembly that ‘codes for’ some particular conscious quality Q, and (b) changes in relations (A)-
(C) among structures of the proprietary type that exemplify the blended quality Q. But there is no 
such one-to-one matching. The structures involved in changes (A)-(C) are neuronally generic—
they are of a range of structure-types whose distribution across the brain is independent of local 
coding-function. Thus, the firing of a particular neural assembly brings about relational changes 
among structures of many types, and the firing of any number of neural assemblies brings about 
relational changes among structures of a single type. Hence, if phenomenal bonding is 
understood in ways (A)-(C), the firing of neural assemblies cannot provide us with a constitutive 
explanation of changes in phenomenal bonding. Moreover, any novel suggestion about the nature 
of phenomenal bonding—beyond (A)-(C)—will be subject to the same worry about a lack of 
neuronal specificity among the structures constitutively affected by neural firing. 
Within a bonding-first paradigm, changes in macro-consciousness amount to changes in 
blending among stably-bonded entities. Extent theories identify phenomenal blending with (D) 
the ‘collapse’ or ‘choosing’ of micro-conscious qualities when basic physical entities combine to 
form chemical composites, and (E) ‘confusion’, that is, indistinguishability among micro-
phenomenal qualities that are experienced together. Does the firing of neural assemblies create 
changes with respect to which basic physical entities are related in these ways? 
Let’s consider each suggestion in turn. (D) Neural firing does involve the formation of 
new chemicals. In particular, the processes that precede the action potential—the neural 
‘computations’ that determine whether, on the basis of excitatory and inhibitory signals received 
by the neurons’ many dendrites, the neuron feeds the signal forward—are quite chemically 
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complicated and require the generation of new molecules.8 The trouble, as before, is that these 
chemical changes are neuronally generic: there are no special chemicals generated in the ramp-
up to the action potential only in neurons within assemblies that code for particular macro-
conscious qualities. Thus, the chemical changes required for neural firing cannot be those 
responsible for changes in blending. 
(E) In order to tell whether neural firing could alter which qualities are ‘confused’ with 
each other, we first need a neurological account of the phenomenon of confusion. I will focus on 
Roelofs’ [2019] account, although the lesson to be drawn from his account generalizes. 
According to Roelofs, confusion is the default result of phenomenal bonding. Blending, that is, 
comes ‘for free’; qualitative differentiation calls out for explanation. Roelofs suggests that what 
explains differentiation is semantic structure—the sort of structure exhibited by redness and 
squareness when these qualities are co-attributed to the same gestalt object (a red square). Thus, 
for Roelofs, changes in consciousness are determined by changes in which (otherwise confused) 
conscious qualities segregate into distinguishable phenomenal units via semantic binding. 
There are two leading theories of the neural correlates of semantic binding.9 According to 
one, binding occurs when neural assemblies that code for different conscious qualities fire in 
synchrony. According to another, there are specific neurons or neural assemblies that code for 
specific conjunctions of qualities. It would appear, then, that Roelofs’ proposal allows us to draw 
a line of constitutive explanation from the firing of certain neurons or neural assemblies 
(multiple in synchrony, or single conjunctive-coders) to changes in blending. But Roelofs’ 
proposal is subject to a dilemma. Binding is either an occurrent phenomenon (first horn) or a 
dispositional phenomenon (second horn). Suppose it is occurrent: it is part of the ‘fabric’ of 
																																																						
8 Thanks to Jim Nelson for clarification on this point. 
9 See, e.g., Schneegans and Bays [2017]. 
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consciousness, a relation that holds among qualities in macro-consciousness. If so, it is not clear 
how neural firing can explain which qualities in macro-consciousness are subject to binding at a 
time. There is, for example, nothing about the intrinsic structure of three neural assemblies, X, Y, 
and Z, that explains why, when X and Y fire in synchrony with each other but not with Z, a 
subject experiences semantic binding between phenomenal blue and phenomenal yellow, but 
experiences phenomenal red as a distinguishable quality. Again: neural assemblies are all made 
of the same, neuronally-generic building-blocks. 
Perhaps Roelofs understands binding as a dispositional phenomenon, then. In this case, 
the binding of two qualities in macro-consciousness is a matter of the way they dispose the 
subject to treat them (that is, as blended or distinct). It is easier to understand how synchronous 
or conjunctive-coder neural firing could explain particular changes to binding, dispositionally 
understood; neurons and neural assemblies, though not intrinsically differentiated, are 
functionally differentiated. But the trouble with the second horn is that it implies that the 
dynamics of consciousness is entirely a dispositional matter. Occurrent consciousness comprises 
a static bond of qualities; all that changes are the discriminatory dispositions of the subject. But 
that’s absurd. Occurrent consciousness changes; conscious qualities come and go.  
This dilemma for Roelofs’ account generalizes to any constitutive account of the 
relationship between neural firing and blending. Neurons and neural assemblies are composed of 
neuronally-generic stuff. The changes they undergo when firing will thus be unable to account 
for which particular qualities enter into occurrent blending-relations. Neural assemblies are 
functionally differentiated, however, so their firings may be able to explain changes in a 
subject’s dispositions with respect to her experiences. But changes in consciousness are more 
than changes in the subject’s dispositions.  
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Constitutive panpsychists are unable to explain the dependence of changes in 
bonding/blending on high-level properties of brains by appeal to a tighter-than-causal (that is, a 
constitutive) relationship. What about a looser-than-causal relationship—that is, a merely nomic 
relationship? Might it just be a law of nature that brains, qua electrical signal-sending networks, 
occasion bonding/blending among their most basic physical constituents in certain 
circumstances? Maybe it is, but constitutive panpsychists are barred from saying this. As Lewtas 
puts the point, such a proposal would ‘envision basic mental-chemical laws whose antecedents 
directly refer to high-level structures S1, S2, S3, etc. These structures therefore have basic but 
high-level capacities (high-level capacities that don’t result from bottom-level entities)’ [Lewtas 
2017: 771]. But constitutive panpsychists eschew all emergence—understood as the appearance 
of fundamental entities, properties, or powers at non-basic ontological levels—in favor of 
bottom-up explanation. Therefore, the only way for constitutive panpsychists to adequately 
explain the dynamics of consciousness is to point to a causal mechanism that can mediate 
between high-level, global, dynamical states and states of aggregates of basic physical entities, 
and this mechanism needs to be explicable in a fully bottom-up way. 
 Premise 6. There is no purely physical mechanism that can ground the explanatory 
dependence of changes with respect to bonding/blending on changes with respect to high-level, 
global, dynamical properties of brains. Broadly speaking, we know of two mechanisms that 
transfer information within the brain. The first is the familiar mechanism of neural signaling via 
action potentials. The second is a less familiar mechanism of electromagnetic propagation via 
field potentials. I’ll discuss the three most plausible models that invoke these mechanisms to 
solve the Selection Problem, plus a fourth, hybrid model. 
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 1. The region-model. Suppose that each region of the brain that codes for a conscious 
quality is also the proprietary bearer of that conscious quality, and suppose that the blending-
first paradigm is correct. Neural signals from other parts of the brain cue or disrupt each regions’ 
bonding with the other regions. Call this the ‘region-model’ of selection. 
 The trouble with this proposal is that the relata in the bonding-relation need to be bearers 
of distinct (blended) qualities, so they need to be intrinsically differentiated from one another in 
some way. But they are not. Though neural assemblies differ from each other in lots of ways, 
there is no proprietary structure unique to each quality-encoding assembly. As we observed 
above: what makes it the case that some neural assembly’s activation represents some visual 
stimuli (say) is its place in the informational network of the brain, not its intrinsic structure.  
 2. The hub-model. While neural assemblies aren’t intrinsically differentiated, smaller 
molecular structures in the brain are intrinsically differentiated. Suppose that there is some 
specific site in the brain where bonding/blending takes place, and suppose (again) that the 
blending-first paradigm is correct. We can imagine that this ‘consciousness hub’ consists of a set 
of distinct structures (differently-shaped proteins, let’s say) each of which has a proprietary 
blended quality, and which can be cued to bond, or to refrain from bonding, with the other 
proteins at the hub. For simplicity, let’s assume that macro-conscious states only require one 
‘sample’ of each blended quality, such that only one instance of each type of structure is needed 
as part of the bond. There is an electrical signal pathway in the brain that begins at the retina and 
proceeds through the portion of visual cortex that correlates with the experience of a given 
color—phenomenal green, for example. Suppose now that the last neuron in this pathway sends 
an electrical or chemical signal to the consciousness hub: specifically, to the protein at that site 
whose blended quality is phenomenal green. Upon receiving the signal, our phenomenal-green 
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structure bonds with other structures that have received similar signals, from their respective 
processing-channels, at the same time. Call this the ‘hub model’ of selection. 
  How empirically plausible is the existence of a ‘consciousness hub’? Some researchers 
have suggested that the prefrontal cortex amounts to a ‘convergence zone’, where all the 
processing streams implicated in consciousness (or in some dimension of consciousness) come 
together. Sevush [2006] claims that it is consistent with our evidence that individual neurons in 
PFC serve as convergence zones. In particular, Sevush proposes that consciousness is composed 
of events occurring at the tens of thousands of synapses belonging to dendrites of a single neuron 
(or rather, many, in parallel) in PFC. But even supposing Sevush is right about this, the synaptic 
events he appeals to are neuronally generic: they consist of the binding of various 
neurotransmitters to neuro-receptors. And there is simply no evidence that the different types of 
neurotransmitter molecules deployed in PFC synapses map onto the different types of macro-
conscious qualities.  
 3. The field-model. The chemical goings-on in neurons (and in glial cells, too) involve a 
lot of electrical activity. Some of this electrical activity is coordinated enough to generate 
electromagnetic fields. Most of these ‘field potentials’ are so weak that they get lost in the 
electromagnetic ‘noise’ of the brain within a few millimeters from their source, but some are 
strong enough to be detected outside the skull (this is what makes EEG possible). Could field 
potentials do the work of cueing the relevant micro-structures to bond/blend when certain neural 
assemblies are active? On a bonding-first paradigm, the idea would be that the electromagnetic 
field generated by the neural assembly that codes for some conscious quality—phenomenal 
green, say—triggers, within the bonded composite of basic physical entities, a blending process 
that generates phenomenal green. On a blending-first paradigm, this would mean that the 
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electromagnetic field generated by the phenomenal-green neural assembly triggers structures of 
the sort whose proprietary blended quality is phenomenal green to phenomenally bond with the 
other qualities that are receiving electromagnetic signals from their correlative neural areas. Call 
either of these proposals the ‘field model’ of selection. 
 While the field model is biophysically possible, we have pretty strong neuroscientific 
evidence against it. For one thing, whether a field is generated has more to do with the 
orientation of a neural assembly and the tissues that surround it than with the structure and 
function of the assembly itself. Some neural assemblies generate field potentials with 
comparatively strong amplitudes, while others produce none, and the differences are not 
systematic. Mainstream neuroscience treats the whole affair as a messy epiphenomenon, rather 
than a fine-tuned intra-cranial communication system [Herreras 2016].  
 For another thing, if there were a unique ‘signature’ (say, a particular frequency) to the 
field generated by particular neural assemblies, then there would be a way to ‘decode’ that 
signature. But this is impossible: researchers are not able to infer the source of a field potential 
from its characteristics [Wadman and Da Silva 2017]. But the field model only works if 
electromagnetic signals are differentiated according to the neural assembly that generated them. 
In short, neural assemblies just aren’t set up to broadcast information, by way of field potentials, 
about the particular qualities they code for.10 
 Might a hybrid model do better? Combining the region-model and the field-model won’t 
get us anywhere, since both models suffer from the same limitation: both of them require that 
neural assemblies be intrinsically differentiated according to the conscious quality that each 
codes for. Combining the hub-model with the field-model is more promising. Suppose that 
																																																						
10 Thanks to Kim Iceman and Oscar Herreras for clarification of these points. 
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Sevush is right that an entire macro-conscious state could be encoded in the chemical events 
occurring in the dendritic tree of a single neuron in PFC. If it turned out that (a) these chemical 
events were sufficiently differentiated to intrinsically code for a set of conscious qualities and (b) 
each generated a unique electromagnetic field, and (c) there were a microscopic consciousness 
hub nearby that could pick up these signals, then we could explain selection via a field/hub 
model.  
But none of these three conditions enjoys any empirical support whatsoever. That is, 
unlike the three models just discussed (hub, region, and field), this hybrid model is not built out 
of neuroscientifically given phenomena, but rather posits new phenomena. True, current 
neuroscience does not rule out these phenomena. But nor does it rule out more wildly speculative 
proposals. For example, the constitutive panpsychist could posit a special kind of brain-field that 
broadcasts information about the high-level behavior of the whole brain to every part of the 
brain, and to which bonded/blended entities are causally responsive. Perhaps such a field is 
constituted by a new physical particle, a ‘menton’ (as Berit Brogaard [2017] has proposed for 
somewhat different purposes11). The point is this: once we move on from models that appeal to 
neuroscientifically given phenomena such as neural signaling or field potentials, our theories are 
going to have to be more and more speculative, constituting a greater and greater departure from 
the trajectory of neuroscience. To the extent that neuroscience is proceeding along the right 
track, we should be hesitant to take such speculations seriously.  
It appears, then, that no purely physical mechanism can explain how changes with respect 
to bonding/blending can depend on changes with respect to high-level, global, dynamical 
properties of the brain. It follows that constitutive panpsychism is false. 
																																																						
11 Peter Unger [2006] credits Yuvul Avner with coining the term. 
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4. Conclusion: A Strained Explanatory Project 
As we have seen, initially promising solutions to the Selection Problem are closed off by the 
empirical facts. I now want to argue that we should have expected as much. Even a very rough 
grasp of how the brain relates to consciousness gives us reason to doubt that the Selection 
Problem is solvable.  
Imagine that LEGO® were to produce a line of translucent bricks that light up, in one of 
the three primary colors, when pressed. Out of these bricks we build a ‘marble run’. When we 
drop a marble into it, we notice that wherever the marble is rolling, that region of the structure 
lights up—sometimes red, yellow, or blue, but sometimes green, orange, or purple, too. We can 
easily construct a bottom-up explanation of this phenomenon: the light-colors of individual 
bricks explain the blended colors of the macro-level parts of structure, and the moving weight of 
the marble explains why different regions of the marble-run light up at different times. 
If the relationship between brain-activity and the dynamics of consciousness were 
analogous to the relationship between marble-motion and colored-light emission in our marble 
run, then constitutive panpsychism would look promising. But it is not analogous. What we find 
in the brain is more like the following. When the marble is in region A of our marble run, the 
whole LEGO structure emits red light; when the marble is in region B, the whole LEGO 
structure emits green light; and so on. It is now not so clear how to explain these changes in a 
bottom-up way. Persisting with constitutive explanation would require saying the following 
about our LEGO structure: (A) It exhibits system-level qualitative states (its overall color at a 
time); (B) Changes in these states depend on changes in system-level functional states (which 
chunk of the structure the marble rolls through at a time); (C) Changes in system-level functional 
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states are not constituted by changes in micro-level qualitative states (the color of the bricks 
doesn’t determine what the marble is doing); nevertheless, (D) System-level qualitative states 
(overall color) are constituted by micro-level qualitative states (colors of the individual bricks). 
That’s weird: given (A) – (D), we don’t expect there to be a constitutive connection between 
micro-level qualities and system-level qualities. Insisting on the analogue of (D) would be like 
insisting that the twisting shapes of a murmuration of birds are constituted by twisting shapes of 
the animals themselves. 
 But constitutive panpsychists have to hold out for an analogue of (A) – (D). They are 
committed to saying that (A) Brains exhibit system-level qualitative states (macro-conscious 
states); (B) Changes in these states depend on changes in system-level functional states (neural 
signaling across the brain at a time); (C) Changes in system-level functional states are not 
constituted by changes in micro-level qualitative states (changes in micro-conscious 
bonding/blending aren’t constituents of the neural signaling process); nevertheless (D) System-
level qualitative states are constituted by micro-level qualitative states (macro-conscious states 
are constituted by bonded/blended micro-conscious states). As in the case of the LEGO marble-
run, (A) – (C) suggest that (D) is wrong-headed. 
 I have been focused entirely on constitutive panpsychism, and in particular constitutive 
micropsychism. I want to end by saying a bit about the implications for neighboring views. 
 First, what about constitutive cosmopsychism? According to this view, the universe as a 
whole is treated as the fundamental tier of reality, and features in every other tier—including all 
phenomenal features—can be constitutively explained in terms of features of the whole. A 
choice-point for this view pertains to how much bottom-up explanation it can accommodate. To 
use Roelofs’ helpful terminology: conservative cosmopsychism treats the universe as 
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explanatorily prior to particles, but treats particles as prior to atoms, atoms as prior to molecules, 
and so forth. Holistic cosmopsychists, on the other hand, invert bottom-up explanation at every 
level. It is thus committed to puzzling claims such as that organisms are prior to cells, cells are 
prior to molecules, etc. 
 Because holistic cosmopsychism denies that part-to-whole explanations are ever correct, 
it is hard to take seriously. Conservative cosmopsychism isn’t subject to this worry, but for that 
very reason, the arguments of this paper apply to it. That is, it differs from constitutive 
micropsychism only by positing another tier to reality below that of the basic physical entities 
(viz., the whole universe). Thus constitutive cosmopsychists face the Selection Problem to the 
same degree as constitutive micropsychists. 
 Let’s turn now to non-constitutive versions of pan(micro)psychism. Giving up on 
constitutive explanation opens up new ways to think about (1) bonding, (2) blending, and (3) 
selecting. By way of illustration: (1) Seager [2017] proposes a non-constitutive account of 
bonding on which micro-subjects fuse with one another to form new, genuinely unified macro-
conscious states. (2) Roelofs [2014] discusses a non-constitutive type of blending, also labelled 
‘fusing’, according to which micro-conscious qualities disappear into the state they compose. (3) 
In connection with Premise 5 above, we considered the possibility that it is just a law of nature 
(unmediated by any physical mechanism) that brains, qua electrical signal-sending networks, 
occasion bonding/blending among their ultimate constituents. 
 As I see it, all of these proposals weaken the central motivation for positing micro-
conscious qualities in the first place. For example, a fusion-operation (whether of bonding or 
blending) on a set of qualities is supposed to generate a state that is ontologically other than, or 
more than, the mereological sum of those qualities. A natural gloss (perhaps not the only 
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possible gloss) is that the input-qualities causally generate the output-state. But note that the 
panpsychist’s initial reason for positing micro-phenomenal qualities was to build macro-
phenomenal states out of them. Once we have granted that the explanatory relation between the 
micro- and the macro- is causal (rather than constitutive), we don’t need to posit micro-conscious 
qualities anymore. We simply need to posit certain causal powers or causal laws had by 
(collections of) basic physical entities. Must the categorical base of a macro-consciousness-
generating-power be a phenomenal or proto-phenomenal quality? I don’t see why.  
 Similarly: on a non-constitutive theory of selection, which micro-conscious qualities get 
selected is a matter of basic law. A panpsychism that embrances an emergentist theory of 
selection along these lines is committed both to new basic laws and to micro-conscious qualities. 
But the dualist emergentist posits basic laws (or basic causal powers), and stops there. Must the 
mechanism for macro-consciousness-generation involve the selection of micro-conscious 
qualities? I don’t see why. 
 Now, panpsychist emergentisms may enjoy explanatory advantages over dualist 
emergentisms in quarters I have not here explored. Nevertheless, the move from constitutive to 
non-constitutive explanation leaves behind one of the two central motivations for panpsychism, 
and thus amounts to a serious concession.12 And that means that the Selection Problem is a 





12 Chalmers [2017b] expresses a similar worry. 
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